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Snapchat and Civic Engagement Among College Students 
 
During the 2016 presidential election cycle, Clinton and Trump used Snapchat as one part of their overall 
voter outreach and engagement efforts. This portion of their campaign strategy was disproportionately 
targeted toward younger voters, since those between 18 and 25 comprise a vast portion of Snapchat’s user 
base. Did their efforts, those of political parties, or those of interest groups on Snapchat produce higher 
levels of civic engagement among college students? We utilize a survey that we conducted from a college 
campus in the Midwest in October 2016 to answer this question. Using a series of matching analyses, we 
discover that those students who sent pictures or videos about interest groups, candidates for office, or 
political parties on Snapchat were more civically and politically active than otherwise similar students 




During the run-up to the 2016 general election, several candidates used Snapchat as part of their 
outreach to potential voters. Rand Paul launched a Snapchat account in January 2014 (Chittal, 2015) and 
used it to upload video of himself taking a chainsaw to the U.S. tax code (Lapowsky, 2016). Jeb Bush’s 
official campaign kickoff rally was on Snapchat Live, with Snapchat staff curating uploads, giving 
viewers behind-the-scenes glimpses of the rally, and helping them feel as if they were there (Chittal, 
2015). During the same week as Jeb Bush’s rally, Snapchat offered “Hello, Hillary 2016” as a live story 
from her New York rally (Chittal, 2015). In addition, Bernie Sanders ran a nine-day campaign during the 
Iowa caucuses as a follow-up to appearing in a Live feature (Piper, 2016).  
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump used Snapchat throughout the 2016 election, as both had 
Snapchat geofilters available for their campaign rallies (Miller, 2016; Piper, 2016). The Clinton campaign 
purchased several anti-Trump geofilters for the Republican National Convention including one with 
yellow police tape that read “Stop Trump” (Piper, 2016). Not to be outdone, the Trump campaign 
purchased filters for the first presidential debate, one of which announced the debate as being between 
Donald J. Trump and “Crooked Hillary,” with a backdrop of fireworks and a row of stars across the 
bottom followed by Trump’s campaign slogan of “Make America Great Again” (Miller, 2016). 
Clinton’s chief digital strategist, Teddy Goff, acknowledged that “…it’s incumbent upon us as a 
campaign to find ways to be authentically fun and interesting if we want to have any hope of earning their 
attention on Snapchat" (Piper, 2016). Amid the attention-getting behavior both campaigns engaged in 
during the 2016 campaign on Snapchat, a question arises: did these actions have impacts on political 
participation that extended beyond the moments of levity, novelty or entertainment they injected into the 
presidential campaign? If Snapchat has an impact, then is its impact unique relative to other social media 
forms? 
Examining Snapchat use among young adults is important because this app reached over 41% of 
those between the ages of 18 and 34 as of September 2015 (Snapchat Ad Page, 2016). In addition, 
Snapchat reported that purchased geofilters like those mentioned earlier can reach between 40 and 60 




potentially broad audience of young adults. But, do the politically relevant activities that younger voters 
perform on Snapchat lead to higher levels of political activity away from the internet? If so, which 
political uses of Snapchat lead to greater levels of other forms of civic engagement? 
To explore these questions, we begin with an overview of Snapchat’s history and its use in the 
2016 presidential election. Then, we develop a case for why political uses of Snapchat may facilitate 
higher levels of civic engagement among young adults. We use data from a 2016 survey of randomly 
chosen 18-25 year-olds at a university located in the Midwest to test our theory.1 We find that what some 
may dismiss as a passing fad with limited impact ends up having important and broader consequences for 
young adult participation. 
Snapchat and Elections 
Snapchat resulted from a partnership between Stanford students in the same fraternity, one of 
whom pitched the idea to a class in 2011 (Wortham, 2013). Its initial appeal to users was its disappearing 
content because senders could use their smartphones to send a picture to someone and set it to disappear 
within one to ten seconds of being viewed (Piwek and Joinson, 2016). The only record of the photo that 
remained on either phone, barring intervention from outside the app, was a timestamp when an 
unidentified object was sent from the sender’s device (Piwek and Joinson, 2016).  
Soon, the ability to use a variety of filters, doodles, and stickers increased its user base. Chat and 
video chat features followed in 2014, as did geofilters tied to a user’s location (Nusca, 2017). Also in 
2014, Snapchat began hosting Live events where users at the event (as determined by their phones’ 
                                                          
1 This dataset appropriately tests the theory because Snapchat had the youngest user base out of the nine leading 
social media platforms in 2014, with 45% of its adult users reported by comScore to be between the ages of 18 and 
24 (Bump, 2015). Snapchat’s growth has been dramatic – by year’s end 2015, its user base climbed to 100 million 





location services) upload ten-second snaps and curators at Snapchat make a small fraction of these 
available on the Live platform to all Snapchat users for 24 hours (Verstraete, 2016). 
In 2015, Snapchat launched Discover, where a variety of media partners, including CNN, ESPN, 
and National Geographic, could post content specifically aimed at Snapchat users every 24 hours. It also 
hired Peter Hamby, a former political reporter for CNN, to head its news division (Mahler, 2015). Outlets 
on Discover quickly drew large numbers of viewers (Bump, 2015). Moreover, he developed educational 
content for Snapchat about how the election works that helped prepare young users to participate in their 
first presidential election (Flynn, 2016). Under his direction, Snapchat added several election-focused 
Discover channels (Flynn, 2016). Additionally, Snapchat used its older tools to encourage participation in 
the presidential election, offering users geofilters that remind people to vote and a “Go Vote” bitmoji 
(Boorstin, 2016). 
As the 2016 election approached, Snapchat harnessed its tools in other ways that promote civic 
engagement. Snapchat Chief Executive Officer Evan Spiegel stated that, “The thing that excited us is we 
really saw an opportunity to not only help politicians reach constituents, but really to help people learn 
about politics in a way that goes beyond just knowledge, like just reading about it or hearing from a 
singular newscaster” (Bump, 2015). In the lead up to the 2016 general election, Snapchat offered 
numerous Live events connected to the presidential campaign, including the conventions and debates. 
Snapchat reported that nearly twice the number of young adults watched the first debate between 
Republican candidates on Snapchat than on television (Rutenberg, 2016). While they watched later 
debates between Trump and Clinton, viewers could place filters on the candidates or swap out their faces 
to amuse themselves, helping young adults engage with politics in a new way (Friesleben, 2016). 
Snapchat hired Rob Saliterman, Google’s former head of political advertising, to convince 
campaigns to use Snapchat (Flynn, 2016; Lapowsky, 2016). Initially, this appeared to be a tough sell 
because Snapchat lacks many of the campaign-friendly features that Facebook and Twitter have. For 
instance, user data are private, user networks tend to be small, ads can only be targeted down to the state 




(Lapowsky, 2016).2 Yet, one of Snapchat’s key selling points to campaigns is its ability to reach young 
adults with ads that fill the screen. Thus, some strategists view it as a viable alternative to television 
advertising for reaching young voters (Lapowsky, 2016), while others liken it to lawn signs seen by 
millions of young adults (Bump, 2015). Bump (2015) identified three ways for politicians to reach young 
adults: convince users to add the politician on Snapchat, buy ads on Discover, or buy ads in Live stories. 
Beyond the efforts of campaigns to reach voters, Snapchat also created Live events that helped its 
users feel part of the election, including “Voting Day” at polling booths, election night watch parties, and 
in a nod to its young user base “Colleges React” (Flynn, 2016). Snapchat allowed users to process the 
election results by uploading their reactions for potential use in a Live feed curated by journalists (Flynn, 
2016). Both Snapchat and the campaigns did a lot to gain the attention of young adults and increase their 
engagement. Did these efforts work? We consider this question in the following sections by focusing on 
how political uses of Snapchat promote civic engagement, a term we use to describe participation in both 
political and civic life. 
Social Media and Civic Engagement 
Young adults have been lambasted for decades for their low levels of political engagement. Both 
exit polls and surveys routinely report young adults engaging in far lower percentages of voting and other 
traditional forms of political participation than their elders (Miller and Shanks, 1996; Zukin, Keeter, 
Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, 2006; Holbein and Hillygus, 2016). When engagement is broadened 
to include civic activities like volunteering for community groups, this age gap appears somewhat 
reduced but still present (Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, 2006). A variety of 
explanations have been offered for this pattern including life cycle effects (Erkulwater, Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady, 2012) and generational differences in world views or conceptions of what makes a 
good citizen (Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2008; Wattenberg, 2011) Whatever its 
                                                          
2 Further, campaigns must rely on Snapchat staff to discover their number of followers and since links cannot be 




cause, this pattern leaves younger Americans underrepresented in civic and political life and has potential 
consequences for both responsiveness to the concerns of this age group and the nation’s long term civic 
and political health.  
However, social media shows some promise in reducing age gaps in participation. Many 
researchers discovered that varying forms of social media are connected with higher levels of civic 
engagement among young adults (Cantijoch, Cutts, and Gibson, 2016; Conroy, Feezell, and Guerrero, 
2012; Gil de Zuniga, Jung and Venezuela, 2012; Rice, Moffett and Madupalli, 2013; Towner, 2013; 
Xenos, Vromen, and Loader, 2014). For example, some have found that higher levels of online news 
consumption are associated with increased political participation (Shah, Kwak, and Holbert, 2001; Kenski 
and Stroud, 2006). In part, this link exists because political information is easily accessible to young 
adults through social media. By obtaining political information online, young adults readily obtain the 
political knowledge needed to participate.  
Others have identified opportunities for higher levels of political participation through the outlets 
for political expression available via social media. The internet and social media provide new forums for 
communicating and spreading political information, allowing users to gain greater self-efficacy and both 
the knowledge and skills needed to participate (Kenski and Stroud, 2006; Shah, McLeod, and Lee, 2009; 
Gil de Zuniga, Bachmann, Hsu, and Brundidge, 2013; Moffett and Rice, 2018). Among young adults, 
many have found that Facebook and Twitter lead to greater levels of offline and online civic engagement 
(Cantijoch et al, 2016; Conroy et al, 2012; Gil de Zuniga et al, 2012; Rice et al, 2013; Towner, 2013; 
Xenos et al, 2014).  
While both routes can lead to greater participation, prior research suggests expressive uses offer 
more direct routes to participation than do informational uses. For example, Gil de Zuniga et al (2013) 
find differential effects of political blog use based on whether that use is consumptive or expressive; 
consuming political blogs does not have a direct relationship with political participation while using blogs 




between tweeting about politics and greater offline civic engagement but not between following political 
tweets and offline civic engagement. 
Snapchat and Information Processing 
Although it provides expressive and consumptive outlets for political participation, many 
researchers have not examined Snapchat use, and the research that exists is relatively limited. For 
example, early news stories on Snapchat use focused on teenagers’ use of it for sexting (Vaterlaus, 
Barnett, Roche and Young, 2016). Yet, focus groups of young adult and adult users found few reported 
using Snapchat in this fashion (Vaterlaus, Barnett, Roche and Young, 2016). Surveys show users report 
turning to it most frequently for distraction, procrastination, and sending selfies and humorous photos 
(Utz, Muscanell and Khalid, 2015). 
At first glance, Snapchat operates at a disadvantage when it comes to promoting participation 
because it is known for its disappearing content. Users typically allow content to be viewed for between 
one and ten seconds and Discover and Live events disappear after 24 hours. Ordinarily, images and 
information that are fleeting might be dismissed as having little chance to have an impact. Yet, Snapchat’s 
disappearing content encourages users to focus on the content and process what they are viewing (boyd, 
2014; Piwek and Joinson, 2016). Rutenberg (2016) notes that Snapchat was created for young adults 
bombarded with a “constant stream of bits and bytes,” unable to process everything. Thus, Snapchat’s 
disappearing content may be an advantage when it comes to promoting participation because it 
encourages users to quickly read, watch, share, or respond. 
If true, then this line of reasoning is consistent with the tenets of information processing theory. 
This theory provides additional insights regarding the connection between activities on Snapchat and 
civic activity. To begin, this theory presumes that people have limited processing capacity, making 
attention a scarce resource (Kahneman, 1973). For information to have any impact, there must be 
exposure, followed by attention (Kahneman, 1973; Mitchell, 1983). Without these early steps, persuasion 
is impossible (McGuire, 1978). Millennials are used to multitasking, but Snapchat makes that harder. 




In a digital world where everyone's flicking through headshots, images, and text without 
processing any of it, Snapchat asks you to stand still and pay attention to the gift that 
someone in your network just gave you. As a result, I watch teens choose not to open a 
Snap the moment they get it because they want to wait for the moment when they can 
appreciate whatever is behind that closed door. And when they do, I watch them tune out 
everything else and just concentrate on what's in front of them. Rather than serving as 
yet-another distraction, Snapchat invites focus. 
 
Thus, Snapchat provides a vehicle for generating Millennial attention to the presidential campaign, a 
necessary first step toward action. 
This theory also states that people devote less attention and processing capacity to advertising 
when they perceive no need for information (Mitchell, 1983), but are more apt to process information 
they consider personally relevant (Kuiper and Rogers, 1979). Through election-related Discover channels, 
Snapchat engages in efforts to convince Millennials that they need information about the election and that 
it is personally relevant. Then, Snapchat supplies 10 second ads purchased by campaigns that consume 
users’ smartphone screen. While users can look away, ten seconds does not offer much time to do 
something else when one’s personal device has been temporarily commandeered by a political ad. 
Snapchat’s continued growth and the popularity of its Live events suggests this attention is a small price 
to pay to continue viewing desired content. Thus, Snapchat not only provides a vehicle for attention, but 
helps move the needle towards attention to presidential campaigns. 
Snapchat encourages users to be “in the moment,” mimicking face-to-face interaction in some 
ways (Verstraete, 2016). Unlike Facebook Live or other forms of social media that make content 
available indefinitely, Snapchat’s limited time horizon for viewing information encourages users to make 
time for it now. This, too, promotes greater information processing. Piwek and Joinson (2016, 365) argue 
that “…the combination of self-destructing images with an immersive interface that restricts the scope of 
user interaction with the content makes Snapchat an instant narrative vehicle that is similar to verbal story 
exchange.” This creates a personal connection with the information shared on Snapchat that carries over 
into Live events. While these events are viewable for 24 hours, the curated footage shot from users’ 
smartphones combined with special behind the scenes access helps Snapchat users feel what it is like to 




experience the kickoffs of presidential campaigns, campaign rallies, and candidate debates Live without 
being physically present. These events made the election more accessible and personally relevant, 
drawing Millennials’ attention in new ways. 
Like other social media platforms, Snapchat allows viewers to engage in real time expression 
about campaign-related content that they view on television. This practice of second screening (Giglietto 
and Selva, 2014) can help increase processing of information beyond attention to elaboration and lead to 
greater civic engagement. For example, tweeting about debates as they unfold and using Twitter hashtags 
to join debate-related conversations increases civic engagement and facilitates conversations with 
strangers (Vacarri, Chadwick, and O’Laughlin, 2015). Yet, compared to other social media platforms with 
larger social circles, Snapchat’s disappearing content and personal connections may give senders of 
political content greater assurance that recipients will watch, listen, or view their messages.  
Snapchat and Civic Engagement 
Snapchat can be used to perform multiple functions that may have differing impacts on civic 
engagement when users adapt them for political purposes. Snapchat’s functions can be divided into 
passive, consumptive activities like monitoring political content posted by others or active, expressive 
activities like sharing political pictures or videos or chatting about politics. Monitoring political content 
may be passive but it provides users an opportunity to gain the knowledge needed to participate. If both 
Snapchat’s and political campaigns’ intentional efforts to help young adults learn about politics worked to 
enhance participation, then monitoring political content posted on Snapchat should lead to greater levels 
of offline political participation.  
Snapchat also provides several ways to communicate about politics that range from using the chat 
function to creating and sharing content. Sharing selfies superimposed with filters that allow one to look 
like Clinton, complete with hairstyle and pantsuit (Tulip, 2016), or sharing images during the debate of 
Trump with a flower crown or Clinton with bunny ears (Friesleben, 2016) with young adults’ closest 
friends or family may seem humorous and trivial. Yet, these uses may encourage political expression, 




expression heightens offline political participation, then all three expressive uses of Snapchat should be 
associated with greater offline participation. If, instead, both Snapchat’s and political campaigns’ efforts 
to provide creative and innovative ways to share political content increased participation, then sharing 
political pictures and video via Snapchat should lead to engaging in higher levels of offline participation, 
but there would not be an expected rise in participation among those who use it to chat about politics. 
Data 
We performed an online survey of randomly selected, full-time undergraduate students between 
the ages of 18 and 25 at a Midwestern public university that has approximately 14,000 students between 
October 11 and 25, 2016. We acquired the entire list of university-assigned student e-mail addresses from 
this University’s Office of Institutional Research and Studies to compose our sample. Each student was 
sent an e-mail that introduced the study and was given a unique link to complete the survey. To encourage 
survey participation, we sent three follow-up emails to students on October 18, October 23, and a final 
one on October 25. Approximately 933 of the 9,576 students that were eligible to complete the survey did 
so. To incentivize student participation in the survey, respondents were entered in a drawing to win a free 
iPad. The response rate for our survey (about 9.7%) lies within the range that other entities have provided 
(see Pew 2016). 3  
Our sample roughly mirrors that which exists in the population at this university. For example, 
our sample is 59.23% female while the population is 54.18% female. Also, our sample is 81.92% whites 
while the population is 72.8% whites. Moreover, our sample is 9.69% African Americans while the 
population is 13.2% African Americans. Finally, the mean age of our undergraduate students in the same 
is 21.12 years, while the population average is 21.00.4 
                                                          
3 The margin of error for this survey is 3.79%. 
4 That said, it is possible that differences between the sample and population drive our results. To account for this 





The dependent variable is the rate with which each student participated in political and civic 
activities away from the internet. Each respondent was asked about the frequency with which they have 
engaged in each of twelve different activities that ranged from “very often” to “never” using a five-point 
scale. These activities include having contacted a newspaper, radio or TV talk show to express one’s 
opinion on an issue; participating in protests, marches, or demonstrations; and working with a group to 
solve a community problem. Then, to create a single measure of political and civic activity, we added the 
values for each of the twelve activities to generate an index that was based on answers to this set of 
questions (α=.83, M = 10.94, SD = 7.12).5 We use a series of matching analyses to test our theoretical 
expectations. Appendix A in the Online Appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the variables 
that we used including question wording. 
Treatment Variables 
We utilized four different variables to determine the effects of Snapchat on civic engagement. We 
asked whether each respondent had monitored what a candidate for political office, political party, or a 
political group posted on Snapchat during 2016 (M=.67, SD = 1.13).6 We also asked respondents whether 
they had sent a picture (M=.54, SD = 1.05), video (M=.41, SD = .98), or chatted (M=.57, SD = 1.02) with 
                                                          
patterns of those analyses are identical to those reported in Tables One and Two with one exception: frequently 
sending pictures loses significance (p=.118). The complete set of results are available in Appendix D, Tables D2 
through D6. 
5 M denotes the mean for that variable, while SD signifies the standard deviation for that variable. 
6 We performed a confirmatory factor analysis to examine whether the measures of activity on Snapchat are 
consistent with one another. It is possible that these measures of activity differ so substantially from one another that 
it does not make sense to analyze them altogether. The confirmatory factor analysis provides strong evidence that 
these treatments are consistent with one another with a reasonably fitted model such that they can be analyzed in the 




someone else via Snapchat about a candidate for office, political party, or a political interest group in 
2016. Each of these questions was asked on a five-point scale that ranged from zero for never having 
done so to four for having performed these activities very often. 
Matching Covariates 
We used four variables to investigate the effects of general political engagement on civic activity. 
First, each student was asked how frequently s/he read internet blogs about politics and current events on 
a five-point response scale (M =1.51, SD = .87) for which zero points were allocated to “Not at all,” and 
four points for “Very often”, as Kerbel and Bloom (2005) suggest that blogs can act as vehicles by which 
to enhance civic engagement. Second, each respondent was asked about the extent to which s/he paid 
attention to presidential campaigns during the 2016 election cycle (M = 2.59, SD = 1.11), as Norris 
(2002) finds that attention to campaigns is connected to higher levels of political activism. We used a 
five-point scale for this question, with values that ranged from zero points for “Not at all interested,” to 
four points for “Very interested.”  
Third, we asked each student about the extent to which s/he is interested in politics on a four-
point scale (M=1.84, SD=.87) ranging from zero points for “Not at all interested,” and three points for 
“Very interested.” 7 Fourth, we constructed an additive index to investigate the effects of peer civic 
experiences on civic engagement based on three questions that examined the extent to which each 
respondent’s friends engaged in a set of activities (M=7.36, SD=2.47). Each of the items were answered 
                                                          
7 It is possible that interest in politics, strong partisanship and being a political science major are so interrelated that 
they add little to the analyses. To consider this possibility, we removed each of these variables one at a time to 
investigate whether our results change. The results largely mirror what is reported here. The results for removing 




on a five-point response scale that ranged from zero points for “strongly disagree,” to four points for 
“strongly agree” (α=.68).8 
Additionally, we employed six variables to measure the effects of personal characteristics on 
civic engagement. First, we account for the strength of each respondent’s partisan attachment because this 
is connected with other forms of political activity (see, e.g., Flavin and Griffin, 2009; Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady and Schlozman, 1995). To measure the extent of partisanship among 
respondents, each student was asked whether s/he identifies as a Republican, Democrat, independent or 
something else. Using two questions with slightly modified wording, each student who self-identified as a 
Democrat or Republican was asked whether s/he strongly or not strongly identified as a Democrat or 
Republican, respectively. Based on the responses, we generated a binary variable that is coded one for 
those who have strong partisan attachments (M=.36, SD=.48). Second, we created a dichotomous variable 
for political science majors based on a question about student major(s) in our surveys (M=.05, SD=.48), 
as students who major in this subject area can have higher levels of civic engagement (Conroy et al, 
2012). 
Third, we investigated the effects of ideology on civic activity, as others have discovered that 
identifying as a conservative or liberal shapes some forms of participation (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Best 
and Kruger, 2005). Each student was asked whether s/he self-identifies as a moderate, liberal, 
conservative, something else, or does not know. If the respondent replied, “unknown” or “don’t know,” 
then we followed up with a question about whether that person identifies themselves as a liberal or 
conservative if they were forced to choose. Based on replies to both questions, we created binary 
                                                          
8 These were the only questions asked about peer civic experiences. Some respondents responded that they did not 
know for these questions. When constructing our index, we coded values for these variables as missing. Thus, there 




variables for conservatives (M=.27, SD=.44) and liberals (M=.35, SD=.48).9 For instance, the binary for 
liberals is coded one when the respondent replied that s/he was a liberal or self-identified as a liberal in 
the follow-up question that was directed to those students who did not know their ideology.10, 11 Fourth, 
we asked each student their sex, and coded this binary variable one for females and zero for males 
(M=.59, SD=.49). Finally, we gathered data on the age of each respondent by asking each student to 
report their month and year of birth. Then, we computed each student’s age based on the month and year 
of the 2016 general election (M=21.15, SD=1.58).12 
Methods 
To determine whether activities on Snapchat are connected with offline civic engagement, we 
need to determine an average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). A matching analysis estimates an 
ATET while a regression-based approach does not. If we solely relied on OLS estimates to obtain our 
results, our results may be biased because any estimate is conditioned on other values of the remaining 
covariates.  
Moreover, individuals have diverging probabilities of engaging in differing levels of political 
activity on Snapchat. An OLS estimator presumes treatment homogeneity, which does not hold here as it 
is possible that individuals have different effects, particularly depending on their level of treatment (see 
Abadie and Imbens, 2011). Thus, the effects of a politically-based activity on Snapchat vary depending on 
the extent to which that respondent engaged in that activity. For instance, those who send politically-
                                                          
9 Our surveys do not contain a measure that allows us to determine the strength of ideological attachment. That said, 
considering ideology in the manner that we do allows us to investigate the effect of ideological direction on civic 
engagement. 
10 We coded the dummy variable for conservatives using the same process. 
11 Collectively, the comparison category for both binary variables is political moderates. 
12 Unfortunately, we lack additional, relevant variables about socioeconomic status such as a student’s (or 




oriented pictures on Snapchat very often are likely to engage in offline civic activities more frequently 
than those who rarely send such pictures on Snapchat. By construction, an OLS-based estimator presumes 
that we observe a linear, homogeneous relationship between sending politically-oriented pictures on 
Snapchat and offline civic activity. A matching-based approach deals effectively with this issue because it 
assumes neither homogeneity nor linearity, and allows for several treatment estimates depending on the 
level of treatment that a respondent received (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Thus, we can generate several, 
more precise estimates of the effect that each level of every activity on Snapchat has on offline civic 
activity. 
Third, OLS does not allow us to estimate what happens to offline civic activity in the absence of 
politically-oriented activities on Snapchat (Nichols, 2007). A matching analysis utilizes the existing data 
to generate a dataset that includes observations that are as similar as possible based on the values of the 
remaining covariates (Stuart, 2010). This allows us to estimate the counterfactual of what would have 
happened in the absence of a politically-oriented activity on Snapchat (see Gelman and Hill, 2007). Then, 
we estimate the effects of a level of a politically-based activity on Snapchat on offline civic activity using 
this dataset. Finally, we repeat this procedure for each level of each politically-based activity on Snapchat. 
Matching analyses rectify each of these issues because they permit us to examine whether varying 
levels of sending pictures or videos on Snapchat is connected with higher levels of other forms of civic 
engagement. By matching based on each of the control variables to make inferences, we can separate the 
impact of both Snapchat-based activities beyond individuals’ other inclinations to participate. Thus, doing 
so allows us to compare people with similar predispositions to civic engagement who vary only in their 
Snapchat use. Moreover, matching allows us to calculate ATETs for each level of each treatment, and by 
doing so, to gain more accurate effect estimates using observational data. 
Assumptions 
We must meet four assumptions prior to performing matching, as the validity of any analyses 
performed using this technique depends greatly on satisfying these assumptions. First, we presume that 




variables dichotomous, we generated a series of binaries for each response option, relative to never 
having done so. These binaries are coded one for each of these categories, zero for never having done so, 
and missing for those who do not have a Snapchat account, declined to answer the question, and for the 
remaining scalar options. For instance, there are binaries for rarely doing an activity on Snapchat, 
sometimes doing so, frequently engaging in this activity, and doing so very often.13 In total, there are 
sixteen binary variables because we have four treatments (monitoring Snapchat posts, engaging in 
politically-oriented chatting, sending pictures and videos) and four levels at which the treatment is 
analyzed (rarely, sometimes, regularly, and very often), relative to never having done one or more of 
these activities. We expect positive signs for the ATET for each variable. 
Second, we assume overlap (or common support), which means that it shall be possible that 
treated units could face an intervention that may have assigned them to the control group (see Imbens and 
Rubin, 2015; King, Lucas and Nielsen, 2017). The data that we use fulfill this requirement because all 
respondents could have chosen not to engage in any of the Snapchat-based political activities. 
Third, we must meet the stable unit treatment value (SUTVA) assumption, which means that, 
“The potential outcomes for any unit do not vary with the treatments assigned to other units, and for each 
unit, there are no different forms or versions of each treatment level, which lead to different potential 
outcomes” (Imbens and Rubin, 2015, 10). Part one of this assumption is satisfied because civic activity 
does not vary with the levels of snapchat engagement in which other individuals engage.14 
                                                          
13 For example, the binary for rarely having monitored is coded one for those who rarely did so, zero for never 
having done so, and missing for those without Snapchat accounts, declined to answer the question, and those who 
responded that they had sometimes, regularly, or very often monitored what candidates for office, political parties, 
or interest groups post on Snapchat. 
14 If civic engagement were related to the decisions of others to engage in one or more activities on Snapchat, then 
we would observe high correlations between one or more of these activities and offline civic engagement. To test 




The second portion of this assumption is more intricate because we have different variations on 
each treatment variable: never, rarely, sometimes, frequently, and very often. Yet, we can compare the 
effects of engaging in each higher level of a Snapchat-based action to those who had never engaged in 
that action. For instance, we can compare those who had rarely engaged in a Snapchat-based action to 
those who had never engaged in that action, if we exclude those who had sometimes, regularly, or very 
often engaged in that action from that analysis.15 We must perform an analogous procedure to compare 
those who had sometimes, frequently, or engaged in each Snapchat-based activity very often if we hope to 
perform a matching analysis without an alternative treatment. When we execute our estimations in this 
way, we end up satisfying the SUTVA assumption because we have no interference, and we have no 
hidden variations of the treatments (Imbens and Rubin, 2015, 10-11). 
Finally, the assignment to treatment must be conditionally independent of the response variable 
given an array of independent variables (D’Agostino, 1998, 2266). By implication, each respondent’s 
assignment to any of the treatments (e.g., sending a picture or a video on Snapchat) is unconnected with 
their level of civic activity, given the values of the remaining independent variables. We observe a broad 
range of participatory levels with respect to civic engagement, and the mean level of civic engagement is 
reasonably low, given the minimum (2) and maximum values (42) possible with this index. Moreover, the 
activities that comprise offline civic engagement do not cause a person to be assigned to one or more 
treatment categories. 
  
                                                          
(monitoring, sending a picture, sending a video, or chatting with someone on Snapchat). The correlations that we 
observed are .34, .37, .42, and .37, respectively. These correlations are sufficiently low such that we can say that the 
first portion of the SUTVA assumption is fulfilled. 
15 If we do not do this, then we cannot satisfy SUTVA, as there would be alternative forms of the treatment (see 





Once we have satisfied the statistical assumptions that underlie matching, we need to select a 
method by which to perform matching. We use one-to-one genetic matching with replacement to perform 
our matching analyses (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013; Sekhon, 2011), while incorporating a propensity 
score into the analysis, as knowing estimated values of this score greatly improves the accuracy of this 
method (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013). Matching with propensity scores allows us to compare 
observations that are otherwise similar on other covariates, but have experienced different treatments. We 
perform our analysis with replacement, as matching discrepancies are smaller because we can use 
untreated units as a match multiple times (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006).16 Finally, we perform our 
matching with a bias correction to eliminate any bias that arises due to the choice of the matching 
estimator without affecting the variance of that estimator (Abadie and Imbens, 2016). 
Results 
Before discussing the results, we must analyze the extent to which the treatment and control 
groups are similar (King, et al, 2017). If these groups are substantially imbalanced, then we cannot use 
matching to estimate effect size. The imbalance statistics for the models that follow are contained in 
Tables B1 through B10 in Appendix B of the Online Appendix. In every case, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) tests are not significant at the .05-level after matching has occurred. Thus, we are confident that we 
have reduced imbalance and have achieved balance, as the minimum t-test p-value after matching across 
all specifications is .095. When we observe this pattern, it shows that, “the corresponding distributions for 
the matched groups are similar across all covariates” (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009, 521). In addition, 
the matched groups have similar characteristics that we observe, such that any remaining differences 
                                                          
16 However, we do not perform a regression following the matching analysis (as Ho et al, 2007 suggest), as Abadie 
and Spiess (2016) state that this is inappropriate when matching is done with replacement as researchers obtain 




across varying levels of Snapchat-based activities can be attributed to the effect of the activities and not to 
preexisting differences (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009). 
[TABLES ONE AND TWO ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
 Tables One and Two displays the effect sizes from each of the matching routines for our four 
dependent variables. The results indicate that some political activities on Snapchat are connected with 
higher levels of civic activity away from that medium while others are not. The results in Table One 
indicate that monitoring politically-oriented Snapchat posts or politically-oriented chatting on that 
medium exhibit little statistically significant connection with offline civic activity. More specifically, 
those who monitor Snapchat posts frequently experience a 3.9-point rise in civic engagement apart from 
that outlet, while those who sometimes engage in politically oriented chatting experience a 3.04-point 
higher level of activity away from that medium. Respectively, these higher levels of engagement are the 
equivalent of performing one activity very often that previously did not happen, or performing one 
activity frequently that previously did not occur.  
Conversely, the results in Table Two show higher levels of offline civic engagement associated 
with sending pictures and sending videos on Snapchat. Altogether, these results suggest that those 
activities that are expressive in nature and require sharing content beyond chatting are connected with 
higher levels of offline civic activity while the passive, consumptive activity of monitoring political 
activity on Snapchat usually are not. 
We examine the results in Table Two in greater detail through Figure One to illustrate the effect 
estimates from these results. The top visual corresponds to sending political pictures while the bottom 
visual corresponds to sending political videos on Snapchat. In each illustration, the vertical axis is the 
ATET while the horizontal axis is the frequency with which each activity was performed. The solid line 
denotes the ATET while the dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval surrounding those effects. 
 The results from Table Two as visualized through Figure One demonstrate several trends. First, 




levels of these activities. More specifically, those who sent pictures about candidates for office, political 
interest groups or political parties via Snapchat experienced approximately six-point higher levels of 
offline engagement if they did this activity either frequently or very often. This equates to participating in 
one additional civic activity away from the internet that otherwise would not have occurred very often 
and participating in another activity at a higher rate. This could also equate to participating in several 
different civic activities at higher levels. 
 Also, those who sent videos about political interest groups, candidates for office, or political 
parties on Snapchat experienced approximately four point higher levels of civic engagement if they 
sometimes did this activity, and by roughly seven points if they did this activity either frequently or very 
often. This suggests that sending videos on Snapchat has a greater effect on civic activity than sending 
pictures did. Practically speaking, this means having participated in one additional civic activity away 
from the internet that otherwise would not have happened very often. For those who sent videos 
frequently or very often, this also entails having participated in at least one other activity at a higher rate 
or participating in several different civic activities at higher levels.  
However, those who sent pictures or videos about candidates for office, political interest groups 
or political parties via Snapchat rarely experienced no changes in civic activity. Altogether, both Snapchat 
activities that represent an active desire to share politics with others – posting political pictures or videos 
about politics – yield higher levels of civic engagement. Thus, those students who post political pictures 
or videos about politics at relatively high rates on Snapchat are the ones that experience higher levels of 
offline civic activity. 
Snapchat vs Facebook 
 While the results furnish evidence that posting political pictures and videos about politics on 
Snapchat is connected with higher levels of offline civic engagement, one can ask how Snapchat 
compares in this respect to other, more established social media forms like Facebook. This comparison is 
important for two reasons. First, this comparison speaks to the relative uniqueness of Snapchat compared 




has a faster tempo (like Snapchat) with one that has a comparatively slower temporal order (like 
Facebook). This comparison is theoretically relevant for our analysis because information processing 
proceeds at a faster rate with a forum that features disappearing content, relative to one where content 
changes at slower rates, increasing the incentive for others to view the material shared before it 
disappears. 
 To perform this comparison, we examine activity on Facebook in an analogous way that we did 
for activities on Snapchat. Using a five-point scale that ranged from zero for never having never done so 
to four for having performed these activities very often, we asked respondents about the extent to which 
they had shared images or webpages related to a candidate for political office, political party, or an 
interest group on that outlet (M=1.21, SD=1.38). When we compare the frequencies at which respondents 
participated in these activities on Facebook with those at which students shared politically-oriented 
pictures and videos on Snapchat, we find that, students were far less apt to share content on Snapchat than 
they were via Facebook. More specifically, 74.5% of student never shared politically oriented pictures on 
Snapchat, nor had 82.1% shared politically-oriented video on Snapchat. Conversely, only 46.56% of 
students never reported having shared pictures and webpages on Facebook. This makes sense because 
Facebook has been around approximately seven years longer than Snapchat, and is more embedded into 
popular culture than Snapchat. This means that a majority of students reported having engaged in 
politically-oriented activities at some level on Facebook17 
 We build on these trends by conducting a matching analysis using the same technique that we had 
with the four Snapchat variables through Tables One and Two.18 To do so, we created four binaries to 
                                                          
17 Table D7 contains the complete comparison of activity levels on Snapchat versus those on Facebook. 
18 The data for this variable satisfy the matching assumptions that existed in the previous estimations. In particular, 
each treatment is binary, there is no interference, and there are no hidden variations of the treatment because of the 
way in which we coded the treatment variables. In addition, each individual’s assignment to one of the Facebook 




correspond to differing treatment levels that are coded in the same fashion as we did for the four Snapchat 
variables. In addition, the dependent variable (offline civic engagement) is the same, as are the covariates 
on which matching occurs. 
[TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE] 
Table Three displays the results for the Facebook analysis. We find that sharing webpages or 
pictures sometimes on Facebook is associated with an approximately three point rise in offline civic 
activity, a more than four-point rise in this activity when it occurs frequently, and a greater than seven 
point surge when this activity happens very often. For those who engaged in sharing webpages or pictures 
on Facebook frequently or very often, this equates to a minimum of having engaged in one additional 
offline civic activity very often that otherwise would not have happened. For those who sometimes 
engaged in sharing pictures of webpages on Facebook, this corresponds to offline civic activities being 
performed at higher rates than they otherwise would have.  
[FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE] 
 Through Figure Two, we compare the results from the analyses in Table Two with those in Table 
Three. The vertical axis is the ATET for each level of the treatment being examined, while the horizontal 
axis is the frequency of each activity (sending pictures on Snapchat, sending videos on Snapchat, and 
sharing pictures and webpages on Facebook). Further, the solid line corresponds to sharing webpages or 
pictures on Facebook; the dotted line corresponds to sending videos on Snapchat; and the dashed line 
corresponds to sending pictures on Snapchat. Three trends emerge from these analyses. First, the ATETs 
are positively associated with the frequency of each activity. Second, those who send videos on Snapchat 
consistently engage in higher levels of offline civic activity relative to those who share pictures and 
                                                          
Further, we satisfy the common support assumption because students could have opted out of having engaged in 
politically-oriented Facebook activities. Finally, we satisfy the SUTVA assumption because offline civic activity 
does not vary with sharing webpages or pictures on Facebook, as the correlation between these variables is .49. This 




webpages on Facebook, especially if they do so regularly. Third, those who send pictures on Snapchat 
experience similarly higher levels of civic activity as those who do so on Facebook when they do so 
regularly and very often. 
Finally, we verified whether the matching results that we report in are model-dependent (see Ho, 
Imai, King, and Stuart, 2007). A limitation of many matching analyses is the danger of p-hacking in 
which one can vary the functional form of the matching algorithm to produce a pattern of results that 
happens to confirm a researcher’s insights (Head et al, 2015). To verify whether this concern arises in this 
analysis, we re-ran the matching routines by excluding one matching variable at a time. The results are 
contained in Appendix C and contain a total of 180 functional forms. 
Of these functional forms, 160 of them (or 88.9%) are identical in terms of the signs and 
significance patterns as those that are reported here. Of the 20 that differ from what are reported here, 
eight of them are situations in which we found statistical significance in the robustness check, but were 
not significant in the analyses we report. The remaining twelve them (or, 60% of the remainder) are in 
cases that are not significant in the robustness check where this analysis reports statistical significance. 
These twelve do not exhibit a pattern that contradicts what we report here. Finally, 93.3% of the models 
contained in the robustness checks either support the results or provide evidence that is even stronger than 
is reported here. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In sum, political uses of Snapchat yield higher levels of civic engagement and provide direct 
evidence that Evan Spiegel’s desire for Snapchat to have a larger role in mobilizing voters has worked. 
Thus, a medium that many may dismiss as inconsequential due to some of the triviality that occurs there 
ends up having significant, positive effects on civic engagement patterns among younger voters. Our 
findings fit nicely into the extant literature on the effects of social media on civic engagement, especially 
among younger voters. Many scholars have discovered that the activities that occur on Facebook and 
Twitter yield higher levels of online and offline civic engagement, particularly among young adults 




Xenos et al, 2014). The results presented here show the effects of sharing political information on 
Snapchat equal or even surpass that of sharing political information on Facebook. 
Yet, the results are consistent with our argument that the mechanism by which Snapchat use 
facilitates higher levels of civic activity is different than that of other social media platforms. The 
evidence suggests that sending videos or pictures about interest groups, political parties or candidates for 
office heightens other forms of civic and political activity. This effect is strongest among those who do so 
frequently or very often. Yet, monitoring Snapchat content from candidates for office, political parties, or 
political interest groups is not connected with much of a statistically significant change in civic 
engagement. Our results suggest that the same activities that are most easily dismissed on the surface as 
trivial or frivolous are also the ones associated with higher levels of civic engagement. 
As with all political science research, our study has some limitations and implications. One 
limitation is that we use cross-sectional data to produce our findings. This approach allows for a 
possibility that may manifest itself here: college students who were already civically engaged are also 
more apt to use Snapchat in politically-oriented ways. While matching helps us deal with this possibility 
through comparing various Snapchat uses by individuals who are otherwise similarly predisposed to civic 
engagement, it does not fully eliminate this explanation. Others can use longitudinal data on college 
students to more effectively deal with this limitation, as there are ways of dealing with causality with 
longitudinal data that are not possible with cross-sectional data.  For example, a longitudinal study would 
make the direction of causality clearer because it enables researchers to compare civic engagement levels 
at two points in time and see whether greater Snapchat use at the first time point produces increases in 
civic engagement at the second time point.  
What is more, we investigated the effects of Snapchat on civic engagement using data that came 
from a single college campus. Thus, we may model campus-specific effects that do not generalize beyond 
the data. This limitation is prescient though, as matching analyses estimate quantities that are localized 




localized enough and of sufficient quality to be able to adequately model the effects of political activity 
on Snapchat on offline civic activity. A survey at a single college campus fulfills these requirements.  
We are also confident that the findings of our research generalize beyond the university that we 
analyze for two reasons. First, the sex of students at this university is similar to that of the median 
comprehensive public university in the state in which it is located (54.18% female at this university vs 
55.7% female at median comprehensive public university).19 Second, the percentage of whites at this 
University (72.8%) is somewhat similar to that which exists at the median comprehensive public 
university in the state in which it is located (65.7%). More broadly, students at this university participate 
at rates that are similar to those at colleges and universities around the United States, as voter turnout was 
3.5% higher at this university than the mean turnout for all colleges and universities in the 2016 general 
election (National Study of Learning, Voting, and Engagement, 2017). However, future research should 
investigate whether Snapchat also helps increase civic engagement among young adults not enrolled in 
college as Flanagan and Levine (2010) identify clear gaps in participation between young adults who 
attend college and those who do not. 
Bimber (2003) cautions against focusing on the impact of specific technologies, as they can be 
fleeting. Yet, our theoretical arguments and findings in support of them are broader than Snapchat itself. 
They suggest that other, future social media platforms with similar features that help encourage creative 
political expression would produce similarly higher levels of civic engagement. In addition, future 
research should consider the impact of disappearing content more directly than our data allows. Because 
shared content disappears quickly, recipients are encouraged to pay it more attention, which also might 
encourage users to prefer it as a method of political expression. Yet, promoting political expression may 
raise concerns about Snapchat’s impact on polarization. Here, the literature is mixed. Political discussions 
                                                          
19 We acquired data on the other public comprehensive universities in this state from their websites for the Fall 2016 
semester, except for two. For one of the two, we used data from the Fall 2017 semester, while we used data for the 




on social media have been characterized as echo chambers in the media and some research supports this 
characterization (Barbera et al, 2015; Bashky et al, 2015). Communication in echo chambers can solidify 
partisanship and political views (Rudolph, 2011), strengthening partisan polarization at the national level 
(Klar, 2014). This might suggest Snapchat use by young adults could worsen polarization. However, 
Boxtell, Genzkow and Shapiro (2017) find that polarization in the public is more prevalent among those 
groups least likely to use social media. Thus, Snapchat use by younger voters could act as a limiting, 
rather than contributing factor in the growth of polarization in American politics. 
Another area for future research lies in investigating who uses Snapchat for political purposes. 
Achen and Bartels (2016) suggest that voting behavior is more connected with group identity than with 
traditional conceptions of a democratic ethos. We do not directly test whether the use of Snapchat or 
behaviors on social media form differ by group identity because our goal is smaller scale: to examine 
whether activities on Snapchat are linked with higher levels of civic activity, broadly speaking. Since we 
have established a link between civic activity and behaviors on Snapchat, even after accounting for 
ideology and strong partisanship, this analysis provides the logical grounding for others to investigate 
whether the use of Snapchat or activity levels on that social media outlet are connected with group 
identities like party, race, and gender.  
While much remains left to discover about political uses of Snapchat, including the possibility of 
indirect links between consumptive uses of Snapchat and civic engagement, our findings have 
implications for those who run political campaigns and those concerned about young adults’ civic 
engagement levels. More specifically, those campaigns that engage voters via Snapchat can successfully 
engage young people. To accomplish this, though, campaigns need to encourage their Snapchat base to 
share videos and pictures related to candidates, parties, and interest groups. Amusing filters, doodles, 
stickers, and bitmojis help do so. This also means that campaigns should provide shareworthy, salient 
material that generates meaningful reactions. By doing so, campaigns can engage a group of voters that 
many chide for their low levels of participation. In addition, those at colleges and universities who wish to 




faculty, and members of student government and organizations who care about generational discrepancies 
in participation might consider creative ways to encourage students to send political pictures and videos 
via Snapchat. By doing so, they can help improve students’ overall rates of civic engagement. This fosters 
a democratic society because it gives meaningful opportunities for all to participate, and not just the usual 
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Notes: The solid lines denote the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) while the dashed lines 








Note: The dashed line corresponds to sending pictures on Snapchat. The dotted line corresponds to 





Table One: Matching Estimates of Monitoring Snapchat Posts and Politically-Oriented Chatting on 
Offline Engagement 
 
 Monitoring Snapchat Posts Politically-Oriented Chatting 
 
 Rarely Sometimes Frequently Very 
Often 
 
























1.535 3.909 6.943 7.493 1.858 5.554 8.113 14.292 
T-Statistic 
 
-.487 .637 2.569 1.607 -.506 2.421 1.023 .548 
P-Value 
 
.630 .524 .010 .108 .613 .015 .306 .584 
N 60 54 40 21 49 64 22 16 
 
Notes: In each two-column set, the level of monitoring is compared with those who never did so. Second, 
the covariates on which the matching is based are described in the text. Third, the effects on offline civic 
engagement are the average treatment effect for the treated (ATET). Finally, the matching results are 
from 1:1 genetic matching with post-matching bias adjustment. Thus, the N represents the matched 





Table Two: Matching Estimates of Sending Videos and Pictures via Snapchat on Offline Engagement  
 
 Sending Pictures Sending Videos 
 
 Rarely Sometimes Frequently Very 
Often 
 
























3.494 3.543 9.780 11.718 4.400 6.896 11.972 11.732 
T-Statistic 
 
1.717 1.579 2.727 2.504 1.181 2.526 2.738 3.277 
P-Value 
 
.086 .114 .006 .012 .238 .012 .006 .001 
N 45 48 23 19 26 34 19 18 
 
Notes: In each two-column set, the level of monitoring is compared with those who never did so. Second, 
the covariates on which the matching is based are described in the text. Third, the effects on offline civic 
engagement are the average treatment effect for the treated (ATET). Finally, the matching results are 
from 1:1 genetic matching with post-matching bias adjustment. Thus, the N represents the matched 





Table Three: Matching Estimates of Sharing Pictures and Webpages via Facebook on Offline 
Engagement  
 
 Sharing on Facebook 
 
 Rarely Sometimes Frequently Very 
Often 
 
Effect on Offline Civic Engagement 
 
1.259 2.876 4.478 7.390 
Abadie-Imbens Standard Error 
 
.776 .843 1.234 1.335 
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 
 
-.281 1.204 2.012 4.724 
95% Confidence Interval Upper Bound 
 
2.799 4.548 6.944 10.056 
T-Statistic 
 
1.622 3.412 3.630 4.813 
P-Value 
 
.105 .001 .0003 <.0001 
N 98 107 65 67 
 
Notes: In each two-column set, the level of monitoring is compared with those who never did so. Second, 
the covariates on which the matching is based are described in the text. Third, the effects on offline civic 
engagement are the average treatment effect for the treated (ATET). Finally, the matching results are 
from 1:1 genetic matching with post-matching bias adjustment. Thus, the N represents the matched 
number of observations. 
 
